The level of competition in the industry of IPO underwriting has been under discussion since Chen and Ritter (2000) pointed out an unusual clustering of gross spreads at seven percent, involving almost all moderatesized IPOs in the US. In Europe, underwriting fees are significantly lower and not as clustered. We find that the firms going public in Europe usually pay fees between 3 and 5 percent, but sometimes as low as 1.25%.
Introduction
The level of competition in the industry of IPO underwriting has been under discussion since Chen and Ritter (2000) pointed out an unusual clustering of gross spreads at seven percent, involving almost all moderatesized IPOs in the US. They argue that an implicit form of collusion (strategic pricing) might have been adopted. Eleven years later, Liu and Ritter (2011) address the inconsistency of perfect competitive models and study the US underwriting industry as a series of local oligopolies. The principal sources of market power they identify are quality, which involves the reputation of the underwriters, industry expertise, and the ancillary services provided. Chen and Ritter (2000) and Liu and Ritter (2011) deal with IPOs in the United States. Europe presents a different story, in that underwriting fees are significantly lower . Our own data confirm a gap of three percentage points between the average underwriting fees in the US and Europe.
Several reasons have been proposed to justify this difference, such as higher quality of services (Torstila 2003) or stronger litigation exposure (Lowry and Shu 2002) . A recent paper by Abrahamson et al. (2011), however, argues that the gap can only barely be justified by the higher marketing costs, legal expenses and litigation exposure of US underwriters combined. A more plausible explanation is the different levels of competition in the two underwriting markets.
Underwriting fees are also not as clustered in Europe as they are in the US (Torstila 2003) . We find that the firms going public in Europe usually pay fees between 3 and 5 percent, but sometimes as low as 1.25% (e.g., the Peacock Group in London in 1999 , or Snam Rete Gas in Milan in 2001 . Only 12% of European IPOs pay the median spread of four percent, while 76% of US IPOs pay the median of seven percent. This variability makes Europe a privileged setting for investigating the determinants of underwriter remuneration. This paper relates the fees paid to underwriters (gross spreads) to the nature and quality of the services they provide. Some services are granted in every IPO (e.g., due diligence, roadshows, book building, and placement), others are others are optional (e.g., price stabilization and liquidity support). The quality of the 'standard' services required in every IPO are related to several factors, such as the characteristics of the firm going public, the risk of the offering, and the quality and reputation of the underwriter. The provision of ancillary services is instead specific to the offering. Ceteris paribus, investment banks should charge higher fees if they offer ancillary services. Price stabilization and liquidity support are particularly crucial for the success of an IPO (Ellis et al. 2000) , We test whether they drive up the underwriting fees.
We model the gross spread as a function of three types of variables: (1) firm-specific, (2) underwriterspecific, and (3) IPO-specific. First, the nature of the company going public is expected to affect the level of fees. For instance, larger firms may be expected to pay less than small firms, as do privatizations and ECOs (Torstila 2001b ). In the second category, the reputation or perceived quality of the underwriter is a source of bargaining power that raises fees (Fang 2005) . Thus, we control for the ranking and internationality of the underwriter. The third category takes into account the level of services provided in the deal. This last aspect represents the main novelty of our paper, in that the model investigates whether a formal commitment of the underwriter to provide ancillary services leads to higher fees.
The official prospectus declarations, though not binding, disclose whether underwriters are 'available' to provide liquidity support and/or stabilize the price in the first month of trading 1 . However, one obstacle with testing is that underwriters do not formally commit to price support, nor do they publicly disclose stabilizing activities. They decide ex post whether, and how much, to stabilize. Perhaps, a legally binding contract could be too costly to define and to enforce (Lewellen 2006) . Since trading activity may be profitable for underwriters, they may be motivated to intervene also when not needed. Vice versa, they may be reluctant to stabilize the price of IPOs when it is costly. We therefore investigate whether the availability to provide ancillary services, declared ex ante, allows underwriters to charge higher fees.
The empirical setting of our paper is Italy, where we can access unique data provided by the stock exchange (Borsa Italiana), including detailed information on the fees charged by underwriters as well as on their services. Investigating the Italian underwriting market may be instructive. First, its institutional setting is similar to most continental European countries, but significantly different from the US market (Abrahamson et al. 2011 ). In the US, IPO allocation policies are discretionary for both retail and institutional investors , while in Europe shares cannot be discretionarily allocated to retail investors (Jenkinson and Jones 2004) . Second, in the Italian market we can study the decision to go public outside of the Anglo-Saxon financial system (Pagano et al. 1998) . Both the UK and the US have well-developed equity markets, and a related industry of financial intermediation centered on providing equity (La Porta et al. 1997 ). Our analysis sheds light on financial intermediation of IPOs in a bank-centered system.
Results reveal that firm and offer characteristics do drive underwriting fees, because economies of scale are influential and because reputable banks are able to charge a premium. Underwriters are also paid to stabilize stock prices, and issuers can pay lower fees by accepting the risk of no aftermarket support. Only half of the IPOs that require this service are actually stabilized after going public. These offerings exhibit poor aftermarket performance, therefore underwriters seem to act properly by stabilizing those IPOs that actually need it. The nationality and reputation of the underwriter are also crucial in the stabilization decision: foreign and highly ranked banks act less promptly to support stock prices, probably because they take public only high-quality firms that are less likely to underperform. Conversely, liquidity support is carried out in 90% of the cases in which the underwriter was asked to provide it, if necessary. However, underwriters support more frequently IPOs taking place during a positive market momentum, raising concerns about the alignment of incentives in the provision of this service.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature on competition in the underwriting industry and gross spread determinants. Section 3 describes the IPO 1 A firm that goes public is required to publish a prospectus. This requirement is based on the governing regulations of the stock exchange where the firm is to be listed. Van der Goot (2003) presents and compares the prospectus liability with particular reference to the role of financial intermediaries in Europe.
underwriting industry in Europe. Section 4 explains the research design and methodologies. Results are summarized in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the article.
Literature review
In the US, IPOs widely adopt the 'seven percent solution' regardless of offer size and underwriting costs (Chen and Ritter 2000) . Moreover, underwriters who persistently underprice IPOs experience superior market share growth, instead of being penalized for leaving money on the table (Hoberg 2007) . This empirical evidence of spread clustering and 'underwriter persistence' is inconsistent with most of the asymmetric, information-based models that attempt to explain IPO equilibrium, such as winner's curse (Rock 1986) , signaling (Allen and Faulhaber 1989) and litigation (Beatty 1993) . Liu and Ritter (2011) argue that the underwriting market in the US is best represented as a series of local oligopolies, where the quality of ancillary services determines market power and underwriters exercise this power through underpricing rather than by charging higher fees. Hence, in equilibrium, neither underpricing nor spread is competitive. Chen and Ritter's (2000) original implicit collusion hypothesis is challenged by another line of research.
Hansen (2001) claims that seven percent is simply the efficient contract that best suits the IPO market, because its low concentration and weak entry barriers are inconsistent with collusive practices. Torstila (2003) documents that clustering also occurs outside the US, though less pervasively, and need not originate in collusive behavior. Yeoman (2001) emphasizes that spreads are negotiated at the beginning of the IPO process, when the expected outcome is still very uncertain. Thus, issuer and underwriter cannot identify the optimal spread and favor the seven percent solution to drop contracting costs.
However, efficiency-based models are unable to justify the 3% gap between European and US fees. Abrahamson et al. (2011) find that this difference persists even after subtracting legal costs, which are not included in European spreads. They wonder why, given that the same banks dominate both markets, US issuers are not charged European fees. The most plausible explanation is the higher level of competition in the underwriting market in Europe.
The issuer's and the underwriter's characteristics are widely recognized as crucial elements in determining the level of fees. For instance, fees decrease with offer size due to substantial economies of scale (Ritter 1987) . Underwriters receive a lower remuneration also in privatizations (Torstila 2001b) , and in venturebacked IPOs (Francis and Hasan 2001) . On the underwriter's side, reputation is crucial. Reputable banks charge a premium because they are able to obtain a higher price for the issuer (Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1994 ) and because they also play a certifying role (Booth and Smith 1986) . In particular, US banks operating in European markets are more costly because of their expertise in case the IPO has to be marketed in the US (Torstila 2001b) .
whether ancillary services affect the gross spread. The only study on this question is Torstila (2001a) , whose prediction that stabilization costs are anticipated by the level of fees finds no empirical support. Yet the provision of underwriting services can be subject to opportunistic behaviors. For instance, discretionary power in the allocation of shares allows underwriters to give preference to rent-seeking investors in hot IPOs, in exchange for larger-than-normal trading commissions. The excess execution costs are known as soft dollars (Loughran and Ritter 2002) . Hot issues may also be allocated to company executives, in order to influence their decisions in hiring underwriters for their own companies' future IPOs and SEOs (Liu and Ritter 2010) . The underwriters' conduct after the issue, when price stabilization and liquidity support services are provided, also remains opaque (Aggarwal 2000) . Ellis et al. (2000) demonstrate that underwriters take substantial inventory positions when stabilizing stock price, and both stabilization and liquidity provision are intrinsically profitable activities. Allocation devices such as overallotment, naked short position, and greenshoe option are crucial for both the decision and the extent of price stabilization. The overallotment option is an agreement between the issuer and its underwriter that allows the underwriter to sell additional shares up to a maximum of 15% of the offered volume., by borrowing additional shares from existing shareholders. Overallotment can be either covered by giving back the corresponding amount of money (greenshoe) or shares (stabilization) to the lenders, or by a combination of the two. The greenshoe option allows underwriters to leave the additional shares on the market and pay them back at the offer price, regardless of current market valuation.
IPO underwriting in Europe
Conversely, price stabilization consists in the underwriter repurchasing shares in the aftermarket, and giving them back to the lenders.
Both greenshoe option and price stabilization can be performed till 30 days after the beginning of trading activity. Although they are not mutually exclusive, the key determinant of the choice should be aftermarket stock price: if the IPO is traded above the offer price, buying shares at the current market valuation (i.e. stabilizing) would be more costly than exercising the greenshoe option. Vice versa, if the IPO is traded below the offer price, paying back the shares at the offer price (i.e. exercising the greenshoe) would imply a loss. Hence, stabilization is typically associated with bad performing IPOs. Underwriters may also take an initial short position even in excess of 15% of the offering, known as 'naked short' position. In this case, the underwriter knows ex ante that it will have to engage in price stabilization.
[ 
Research design

Data and methodology
We collect information on the characteristics of firms, offers, and underwriting syndicates directly from IPO prospectuses. Information regarding price stabilization and liquidity support is provided by Borsa Italiana through the MarketConnect database. In particular, we access the amounts of shares bought and sold by underwriters both for stabilization and liquidity support purposes, throughout the first month of trading. This information allows us to identify which IPOs are price-stabilized and/or liquidity-supported by underwriters, and to what extent 5 .
We run three types of regressions. First, we use a cross-sectional OLS model to investigate the influence of ancillary services on the gross spread. Second, we study the ancillary service of price stabilization. Since the intensity of this activity is observable only when the underwriter decides to intervene, we correct for selection bias by employing a two-step Heckman procedure. In the first step, the dependent variable is a dummy related to the underwriter's decision. The critical determinant is aftermarket performance, which is endogenous because it is in turn influenced by the underwriter's intervention. Thus, we adopt an instrumental variable approach by employing a set of instruments aimed at identifying bad performing IPOs. In the second step, we study the determinants of the intensity of price stabilization, with the dependent variable measuring the quantity of shares purchased by the underwriter during the provision of this service, scaled by the first month turnover. An analogous selection issue arises for liquidity support. However, since declaration is not substantiated in only 6 cases, the estimation of Heckman's first step would become ineffective. Thus, we employ a Tobit model treating the dependent variable as censored at zero in absence of this service. Table 2 summarizes the definitions and theoretical justifications of the variables included in the gross spread regression. We consider variables in three categories: (1) firm and offer characteristics; (2) underwriter characteristics; (3) and their actual provision of ancillary services.
Variables
In the first group, we employ firm age at the IPO as a proxy for maturity, while size controls for economies of scale. We also include relative issue size, dilution ratio, and institutional allocation. Since underwriting IPOs in a very hot period may require lower effort by investment banks, with potential reductions in fees, we add the return of the FTSE Italia MIB index 100 days before the listing date (pre-IPO market return), and the number of IPOs in the previous twelve months (market momentum). Finally, we include price revision, the greenshoe option, claw-back clauses 6 , and underpricing to see whether the gross spread has any predictive power regarding their use.
The second set of determinants is related to the underwriter. First, we include a dummy to indicate when non-Italian banks are involved in the process. The underwriter's reputation is proxied by its market share 5 Stabilization data are disclosed in a report transmitted to Borsa Italiana by the underwriter at the end of the first trading month, and is available for all IPOs. Liquidity support is identified by a flag on trades accomplished to this purpose, although we have no information for 40 of the 87 offerings in which a specialist (liquidity provider) was designated. 6 Claw-back clauses are provisions allowing the underwriter to shift shares from one investor category to another, in order to manage different levels of oversubscription. Bertoni et al. (2008) find that underwriters in Italy increase the fraction of the shares allotted to the public when the first day return is negative.
(proceeds) in the Italian market 7 . The size of the underwriting syndicate is also included, because large syndicates allow to share the IPO risk (Torstila 2001b ).
Finally, the third group contains explanatory variables. Two dummies identify IPOs that did not require price stabilization and liquidity support ex ante. The aim is to test whether issuers have the possibility to pay lower fees by renouncing the underwriter's formal commitment to provide these services.
[ We also defined underwriter reputation with reference to the number of IPOs managed instead of capital raised, finding similar results. These models are not reported in this paper. 8 The average value of the Standard segment is inflated by the 532.6% underpricing of Finmatica, gone public on the main market in November 24, 1999, and then transferred to the newly launched Nuovo Mercato in October 16, 2000.
The 171 IPOs of the sample are underwritten by 31 different investment banks, as reported in However, in Italy US banks underwrite only the largest offers.
[ [1999] [2000] charge a fee premium due to the higher risk associated with offerings mainly conducted by small firms with no established track records and uncertain growth prospects. Predictably, firm and offer characteristics affect the level of underwriters' remuneration. According to Torstila (2001b) , there are at least three explanations for the negative impact of size. First, IPOs have fixed costs, such as prospectus preparation, marketing and consulting, which become less significant as offerings grow larger. Second, the size of the IPO is inversely related to risk, in that smaller companies are typically subject to higher uncertainty. Third, large IPOs are more sought after by investment banks, so competition may result in lower fees. In less diluted offerings, suggesting an exit rather than a growth strategy of the firm going public, and in presence of lower institutional participation, signaling weak interest by well-informed investors, underwriters charge higher fees.
Results
Gross spread determinants
Prestigious banks benefit from a significantly positive fee premium. Increased bargaining power and the issuers' perception that these banks are able to provide higher quality services are both plausible explanations. We also find that issuers that do not require ex ante the stabilization service pay lower fees. If a firm going public is willing to bear the risk of no aftermarket support, it can save on the remuneration of its investment bank. Finally, the level of fees does not anticipate whether prospectus declarations will be pursued or not, for both the two ancillary services.
Underwriter's behavior in the aftermarket
We now examine the underwriters' conduct in providing price stabilization and liquidity support. Figure 2 offers a clear picture of how underwriters cover the initial short position, undertaken in 62.6% of the IPOs.
The graph refers to the end of the first month of trading, and shows the average fraction covered by exercising the greenshoe option, and the average fraction covered by stabilizing the IPO, both expressed in percentage of the initial short position (i.e., 100% corresponds to the sum of overallotment and naked short, if any). IPOs are categorized in four groups, according to the number of days within the first month in which the IPO is traded below the offer price.
[FIGURE 2]
The largest fraction of short position is covered using the greenshoe option, which is exercised at a nearly constant rate, regardless of price trends. This is not particularly surprising, as underwriters have the incentive to exercise the greenshoe even for offerings that trade below the offer price, because they earn fees in percentage of all the shares issued. Price stabilization is more intense in bad performing offerings, confirming that aftermarket performance drives its provision. However, some stabilization activity occurs even when the stock price keeps persistently higher than the offer price. Stabilizing well performing offerings is costly for underwriters, and raises some questions about their behavior in the provision of aftermarket services.
Therefore, we try to unveil the determinants of the stabilization decision using a Heckman selection model.
We include overallotment, naked short, and greenshoe dummies to control for short covering (i.e., 'non discretional' stabilization). Price performance during the first month is the driver for the provision of this service, but it is in turn influenced by stabilization activity, hence endogenous. Therefore, we adopt an instrumental variable approach by employing the following instruments for the 1-month buy-and-hold abnormal return: pre-IPO market return, market momentum, underpricing and claw back clauses to retail investors 10 . The results of this model are shown in Table 6 .
[ Underwriters do seem to support bad performing IPOs. The coefficient of the instrumented variable for the first month buy-and-hold abnormal return is significantly negative, documenting that a poor aftermarket performance triggers the provision of this service. Additionally, IPOs that experience a downward price revision are more likely to be stabilized. Curiously, foreign and more reputable underwriters are less prone to provide this service. This may be explained by the endogeneity of matching between issuer and underwriter (Fang 2005) : prestigious banks have stricter standards, so they take public only high-quality firms which are less likely to underperform, and therefore less likely to need price support.
Conversely, gross spread seems to be an ineffective incentive for the undewriter's decision. Surprisingly, the overallotment, greenshoe option, and naked short dummies are not significant, suggesting that underwriters still act with a certain degree of discretion. The second column documents that neither offer size nor the extent of the short position are influential on the intensity of stabilization, measured as the volume of shares purchased to stabilize, scaled by the first month turnover. Instead, the negative coefficient of the fraction of exercised greenshoe confirms its substitutability for price stabilization. Table 7 reports the results of the Tobit regression models on the provision of liquidity support in the aftermarket. Surprisingly, we find that a positive market momentum is associated with a higher probability and greater intensity of liquidity support. This may raise an issue of misalignment of incentives between the issuer and the underwriter, since IPOs taking place in favorable market conditions should be less exposed to liquidity problems. Performance-related indicators such as price revision and underpricing do not significantly impact the provision of this service, nor do the underwriter's characteristics. Finally, the significance of the stabilization dummy signals a synergy between the two ancillary services: when underwriters engage in price stabilization, they also tend to support liquidity.
[ Pre-IPO market return FTSE Italia MIB index return over 100 days prior the IPO Market returns capture investment opportunities, investor sentiment and other unknown dynamics (Lowry 2003) Market momentum Number of IPOs in the Italian market during the 12 months before listing Favorable market sentiment makes trading activity more profitable for underwriters (Ellis et al. 2000) Price revision Percentage difference between the offer price and the midpoint of the preliminary price range
Price revision should impound public and private information on investor demand gathered in the bookbuilding process (Benveniste and Spindt 1989) Claw back to retail Fraction of shares shifted from institutional to retail investors after the initial allocation, as percentage of total number of offered shares
Balance of cold demand of informed institutional investors with hot demand of non-informed retail investors
Underpricing Percentage difference between first day official price and offer price Spread and underpricing can be correlated (Kim et al. 2010) Greenshoe exercised Dummy equal to 1 in case the greenshoe option was exercised Exercising the greenshoe option is a substitute for price stabilization
UNDERWRITER
Foreign underwriter Dummy for non-Italian lead underwriters US banks underwriting European IPOs are more costly (Torstila 2001b) Underwriter reputation Amount of capital raised by the underwriter over the total capital raised in the sample (scaled to 1 = 'national champion' Mediobanca)
Reputable banks charge higher fees and provide higher quality services (Fang 2005) Syndicate size Number of members of the underwriting syndicate Syndicate size is important for the IPO risk sharing (Torstila 2001b )
ANCILLARY SERVICES (explanatory)
Stabilization not required Table 5 . 1-month BHAR is the instrumented variable for aftermarket performance, obtained using pre-IPO market return, market momentum, underpricing and claw back to retail as instruments. Overallotment is a dummy equal to 1 in case of the underwriter sells shares in excess of the offered volume; greenshoe is a dummy equal to 1 in case the greenshoe option is exercised; naked short is a dummy equal to 1 in case the underwriter overallocates more than 15% of the offering; overallotment volume are overallocated shares in percentage of offer volume; greenshoe volume is the fraction of greenshoe exercised (0-15% of offer volume); naked short volume is the amount of naked short in percentage of offer volume.
Step Table 5 . Greenshoe volume is defined in Table 6 . Stabilization performed is a dummy equal to 1 if the underwriter stabilizes aftermarket stock price.
(1) Abrahamson et al. (2011) , European data are from the EurIPO database (www.euripo.eu). IPOs with proceeds below $20 million and €15 million are excluded because of the effects of economies of scale. The number of observations (IPOs) is reported below the country labels. The black central mark is the median, the edges of the boxes are the 25th and 75th percentiles, and the dots represent maximum and minimum values.
Figure 2. Short covering activity by underwriters
The graph shows how underwriters have covered their initial short position at the end of the first month of trading. Dark grey is the average fraction covered by greenshoe option, light grey is the average fraction covered by price stabilization. Y-axis reports the short position undertaken by underwriters at the IPO, where 100% is the sum of overallotment and naked short, if any. Categories on the x-axis refer to the number of days (during the first 30 days of trading) in which the official daily price of the stock was below the offer price. Table 5 The table reports the variance inflation factor coefficients for each of the independent variables included in the regression on gross spread (Table 5) . 
Appendix 1. Variance inflation factors for the regressors in
